Under 1302 the First Novgorod Chronicles in a brief entry mention that Novgorodian envoys brought back a treaty they had concluded in Denmark. In Danish historiography this has gone unobserved. Although the text of the treaty is not preserved, the fact that it was concluded, in its international context, helps explain the reversal in alliances between the Scandinavian countries that took place late in 1302. 

Besides the chronicle text we have one document that originates from the diplomatic process leading to the conclusion of the treaty. This is a letter of credentials for the envoys from the Novgorod authorities. On internat evidence it can be dated to March 1301 - May 1302 and is preserved in original in Riga's city archive. According to this letter the Russian envoys were sent to Denmark in response to a previous Danish embassy to Novgorod. Therefore the initiative to conclude a treaty came from Denmark and the decision to make the approach must have been taken already in 1300. 

The international situation, against which the treaty must be seen, was dominated by two long-term confrontations; one between the ruling Danish dynasty and the Norwegian king, supported by a number of exiled Danish aristocrats, including the Danish archbishop; the other between Sweden and Novgorod. 

The Swedish-Novgorodian confrontation resulted from a Swedish expansionist policy that aimed at gaining control over the sea routes to Novgorod. An early success was the foundation of Viborg at the Northern outlet from Lake Ladoga in 1293. In 1301, however, the Swedes suffered defeat, when Novgorod was able to retake and demolish Landskrone, which the Swedes a year earlier had built on the southern outlet, the Neva. For the time being this put an end to Swedish dreams of complete control over trade along the sea routes to Novgorod. 

The Hansa towns, with Lübeck as their leader, had interests to protect in both these confrontations. Especially they wished to secure free trade on Novgorod. They had, however, to navigate with care between the different powers in the region. In both Denmark and Sweden they had received profitable privileges, which for the Scandinavian kings was one way of buying the Hansa's neutrality in other regions. 

The Swedish attempt to control trade on Novgorod, however, worried the Hansa towns, and when the Swedish king in the 1280s sought to bring Gotland and Visby firmly under royal power, Lübeck in the 1290s attempted to take over Visby's position as key point in Hansa trade on Novgorod. At the same time the Hansa urged the Swedish king to grant them free passage through the Neva, but only received a time-limited, restricted permission to trade with Novgorod. 

On assuming personal rule, the young Danish king, Erik Menved, embarked on a policy that aimed at reestablishing Denmark as the dominant power in the Baltic region, as it had been during the reign of Valdemar Sejr. In may 1301, he had a vidimation made of Emperor Frederick II's privilege from 1214, which at the time had confirmed Danish sovereignty over the lands north of Rivers Elde and Elbe. This does not, however, mark the starting point of his ambitious policy. The decision to approach Novgorod must have been taken earlier, but already in 1294, six months before the Swedish king gave the Hansa its restricted permission to trade with Novgorod, Erik Menved emphasized in a set of privileges to the Hansa that he particularly wanted to protect those merchants who traded on Novgorod, granting free and safe passage through his lands and waters and beyond to Novgorod. This allowed the merchants to abstain from using the sea route to Lake Ladoga and instead disembark at Reval and travel over land to Novgorod. Accordingly this period saw a general increase in the use of the in-land route. 

Riga was another harbour that could be used to reach both Novgorod, Pskov and Smolensk over land. In 1298 the Danish king made use of the critical situation, in which the Archbishopric of Riga found itself in its conflict with the Teutonic Order. With the archbishop captured, the Chapter in a treaty with the Danish king subjected itself to the king, who as a result now controlled both the most important points of disembarkation in the East-West trade. 

Also the fact that the Danish king held such a position of authority in Riga has gone unobserved in recent Danish historiography. That Danish authority in Riga over a period was a reality is, however, supported by the role the archbishopric soon came to play in the solution of the conflict between Erik Menved and his archbishop, Jens Grand. The Pope had sent his curate, Isarn, to execute his ruling from 1297 in favour of the archbishop. When this proved impossible the Pope and King Erik instead agreed on a solution, by which lsarn, now conveniently installed as archbishop in Riga, and Jens Grand should exchange sees. Only the king's installation as sovereign by the chapter explains how Riga could play this role. That Novgorod's letter of credentials, composed at the earliest in the spring of 1301, ended up in Riga's city archive is a further indication of Danish authority in Riga at the time. 

While the Swedish king, risking confrontation with the Hansa, in vain fought a war to gain control over the sea routes to Novgorod, the Danish king by skillful diplomacy managed to bring virtually all alternative routes under his control, retaining good relations with the Hansa. 

How did this reflect on Danish-Swedish relations? Originally the same preconditions for a confrontation as between Denmark and Norway prevailed. When the later Norwegian king, Magnus, had married one daughter of King Erik Plovpenning, the Swedish king, Valdemar Birgersson, married another. In 1277, however, the Swedish king was dethroned by his brother, Magnus Ladulås. This quickly led to a new Danish-Swedish understanding, cemented through consecutive agreements, in 1282 and 1288, on double marriages. Since several,of those involved were minors, the marriages took place later, the last as late as 1298. At that moment the Danish-Swedish alliance was still firm. 

Soon after, however, it ended abruptly. At Solberga the Swedish and Norwegian kings met in September 1302 and concluded an alliance. Present were also: a leading representative of the Danish opposition in exile; King Birger's brother Duke Erik, who at the meeting was betrothed to King Håkon's daughter, through whom the Norwegian crown were to be inherited; and last but not least the Swedish marsk, Tyrgils Knutsson, who, governing Sweden during King Birger's minority, had masterminded Sweden's eastward expansion. 

With one stroke the Swedish king had repudiated the Danish alliance and instead joined the Norwegian king and the Danish opposition. 

To assess and explain this reversal in Scandinavian alliances has proved difficult, because scholars have not observed that the Danish king, before he embarked on a policy of extending his influence along the southern coast of the Baltic, made strong and successful attempts to gain infiuence along its eastern coast, achieving similar goals to those the Swedes went to war for. Then, at the very moment the Swedes, with the building of Landskrone, made their most ambitious move against Novgorod and lost, the Danish king took the initiative to conclude a treaty with Novgorod. Undoubtedly, this was what provoked Sweden to abandon its alliance with Denmark and instead join forces with Denmark's main enemies.